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I. INTRODUCTION
N response to the growing problem of sentencing disparity
among federal trial judges, on October 12, 1984, Congress
passed the Sentencing Act of 1984 ("Act"),' which amended the
sentencing provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Be-
cause the majority of the Act will not become effective until No-
vember 1, 1986, and to better understand the effect of the new
sentencing provisions, a general overview of the present sentenc-
ing procedures may be of interest to those concerned with the
subject.
II. THE PRESENT SENTENCING STATUTE
Under the present statute, once a defendant is convicted of a
crime, the court may impose a term of imprisonment, suspend the
imposition or execution of ajail sentence and place the defendant
on probation, or impose a fine.
A. Incarceration
If the court elects to impose a term of imprisonment, the
present statute does not provide any general sentencing guide-
lines to help federal judges in their sentencing determination.
t Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
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Under the current statute at least seventeen levels of confinement
are authorized, ranging from thirty days to life imprisonment. 2
Additionally, special sentencing provisions exist for dangerous
special offenders3 and dangerous special drug offenders.
4
Release on parole is available to a defendant who has been
sentenced in excess of one year. 5 The court may "designate in
the sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the
expiration of which the prisoner shall become eligible for parole,
which term may be less than but shall not be more than one-third
of the maximum sentence imposed by the court," 6 or the court
may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment and specify that
the Parole Commission is to determine when the prisoner is eligi-
ble for parole.7 When the court imposes a maximum sentence and
leaves it to the Parole Commission to determine parole eligibility,
the court is permitted, but not required, to articulate its reasons
for so doing. Unless the court makes a statement on the record as
to its reasons, the Parole Commission in making its parole deter-
mination has no way of assessing or consequently, effectuating
the court's sentencing intentions if it has any.
B. Probation
If the court elects to suspend the execution of a sentence, the
defendant may be placed on probation "for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems best."8 Probation
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1030 and S. REP. No. 634, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3294.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982). This section has often been challenged on
grounds of vagueness, but has survived constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., United
States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 1982) (that Congress might have chosen
more precise language did not render this section unconstitutionally vague, as
long as people of ordinary intelligence weren't required to guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Both of these special sentenc-
ing provisions are repealed effective November 1, 1986, when the new Act takes
effect.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982). Section 4205(a) states:
[w]henever confined and serving a definite term or terms of more than
one year, a prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole after serving
one-third of such term or terms or after serving ten years of a life sen-
tence or of a sentence of over thirty years, except to the extent other-
wise provided by law.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) (1982).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1982). All prisoners sentenced to a term of
more than one year are eligible for release or parole after serving ten years of a
life sentence or of a sentence of over thirty years. Id. § 4205(a). This section is
repealed effective November 1, 1986.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
[Vol. 3 1: p. 12991300
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may be used "whether the offense is punishable by fine or impris-
onment or both,"9 but may not exceed a maximum term of five
years.' 0 This section does not mandate imposition of any condi-
tions of probation but does list specific conditions that the court
may elect to require. For example, the defendant may have to pay
a fine as a specific condition of probation, make restitution or rep-
aration for actual damages, support persons for whom he is le-
gally responsible, reside in a community treatment center, limit
travel or participate in a drug treatment program.""
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary ("Committee"), in
examining various studies found many problems with the present
sentencing statute including the principle evil of disparity. The
Committee concluded that differences in traits and characteristics
of various offenders are not the predominant reason for sentenc-
ing disparity. Rather, some judges, as a result of attitude or phi-
losophy, tend to impose tough sentences while others are
generally lenient in sentence imposition. Some judges are more
harsh in respect to certain types of criminal activity or offenses.
The Committee concluded that such differences, though presum-
ably legal, are unjustified. Excessively high sentences in compari-
son with lesser sentences for similar offenders, especially for the
same offense, are unfair to the defendant who receives the high
sentence. An unjustifiably low sentence is correspondingly unfair
to the public. 12
The concern that many federal judges have voiced with re-
spect to the imposition of a fine is that the maximum amounts are
very low, thus ineffective in accomplishing the goals of sentenc-
ing. This problem is exacerbated by a large disparity between
levels of fines permitted as criminal sanctions for essentially simi-
lar offenses. 13 "By combining imprisonment and fine variations,




12. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3182, 3227-29.
13. Id. at 3286.
There exists today the anomalous situation in which a typical felony
may be punishable on the one hand by a maximum of five years' impris-
onment, and on the other hand by a maximum fine of only $5,000 or
$10,000. Before the two facets of the stated penalty may be seriously
considered as alternatives to one another, they must be of roughly
equivalent severity. Yet today, five years of a person's freedom, even
when measured according to the average individual's earning power
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Comparison of punishment provisions for particular offenses
leads to the exposure of numerous apparent inconsistencies."' 14
In response to these and other perceived problems with the pres-
ent sentencing statute, Congress passed the Sentencing Act of
1984.
III. THE SENTENCING ACT OF 1984
Under the new Act, chapters 227, 229, and 231 are repealed
effective November 1, 1986, and new chapters are to be substi-
tuted. Most of the provisions contained in the new Act are to take
effect November 1, 1986. The purpose of these new sentencing
provisions is stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2):
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the de-
fendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
tional treatment in the most effective manner.
These purposes pervade all of the sentencing options.
Under the new statute, when imposing a sentence the court is
to consider the need for the sentence in terms of the above-stated
purposes;' 5 the nature and circumstances of the committed of-
fense; the defendant's previous criminal record; 16 the types of
sentences available; 17 the sentencing range for that offense com-
mitted by that defendant;' 8 any policy statements in effect on the
date the defendant is sentenced; 19 and the need to avoid sentence
disparities among similar defendants in similar circumstances.20
The sentence must be imposed within guidelines set by the
United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Commis-
sion"). 21 These guidelines were to be promulgated initially by
14. Id. at 3294.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. H 1984).
16. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
17. Id. § 3553(a)(3).
18. Id. § 3553(a)(4).
19. Id. § 3553(a)(5).
20. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
21. The Sentencing Commission is comprised of seven voting members
and one non-voting member. At least three of the members must be federal
1302 [Vol. 31: p. 1299
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April, 1986. The Sentencing Commission requested an extension
of twelve months. On December 16, 1985, the House passed a
bill delaying the deadline until April, 1987.22
Offenses are classified into five classes of felony, three classes
of misdemeanor and offenses based upon their maximum term of
imprisonment.2 3 The court may sentence an offender to a period
of incarceration or, under certain circumstances, to a period of
probation, or impose a fine separately or in conjunction with pro-
bation or imprisonment.2 4 Additionally, where authorized, the
court may enter an order of criminal forfeiture, an order of notice
to victims, or an order of restitution.25
A. Incarceration
As under present law, an offender may be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment if he or she is convicted of committing cer-
tain crimes. 26 Subsection (b) lists nine categories (5 felony cate-
gories, 3 misdemeanor categories, 1 infraction category) of
offenses and specifies the maximum term of imprisonment for
each category.2 7 These terms of imprisonment apply only to
crimes which are listed in the statute. The Sentencing Commis-
sion has not yet delineated these categories of offenses. There-
fore, in the interim the court must look to the term of
imprisonment specified in the specific statute defining the of-
fense.2 8 When imposing a sentence, the court must consider the
factors enumerated in section 3533(a)2 9 to the extent applicable,
keeping in mind that jail is not an appropriate means of promot-
ing correction and rehabilitation.3 0 This caution was added to
judges in regular active service and no more than four members shall be of the
same political party. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. III 1985). On October 29, 1985,
Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr. (D.S.C.) was sworn in as Chairman of the Sentenc-
ing Commission. The Third Branch, Vol. 18, No. 1,January 1986. The following
are the members of the Sentencing Commission: Commissioner Michael K.
Block, Judge Stephen G. Breyer, Commissioner Helen G. Corrothers, Judge
George E. MacKinnon, Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel, and Commissioner Paul
H. Robinson. Ex officio members are Benjamin F. Baer and Ronald L. Gainer.
22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (Supp. 11 1984). For example, if the maximum
term of imprisonment authorized is less than five years but more than one year,
the offense is classified as a class E felony. Id. § 3559(a)(1)(E).
24. Id. § 3551(b), (c).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 3581 (a).
27. See id. § 3581(b).
28. Id. § 3559(b)(2).
29. Id. § 3533(a).
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guard against imposition of a sentence of imprisonment on the
sole ground that the prison has a program that may be of some
benefit to the defendant.3 '
The sentence imposed by a judge pursuant to section 3581
will reflect the amount of time that a convicted offender will stay
in prison subject to any credit, which will be discussed later. This
use of determinate sentencing is a "substantial departure from
the sentencing philosophy on which current law is based."'3 2 That
is, rehabilitation is no longer the basis of a parole release deci-
sion. The Committee concluded "that the indeterminate sen-
tence no longer has a role to play in the context of a guideline
sentencing system. The guideline sentencing system must totally
supplant the indeterminate sentencing system in order to be suc-
cessful. Accordingly, all sentences to imprisonment under the
new system are determinate. "3 3
Guidelines concerning multiple sentences of imprisonment
have been added to enable the court to decide whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive terms.3 4 The guidelines are expressed
in section 3553(a).3 5
Once a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment greater
than one year, he may receive credit toward service of his sen-
tence for satisfactory behavior. This "good time" provision ap-
plies to defendants with a sentence of greater than one year and
less than life. A credit of fifty-four days is allowed at the end of
each year after the first year of the term of the sentence has been
served. The Bureau of Prisons may determine what amount, if
any, is warranted by the prisoner's behavior.3 6
Section 3583 provides that in addition to a term of imprison-
31. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3302. Section 3582(a) speci-
fies that the judge should recognize "that imprisonment is not an appropriate
means of promoting correction and rehabilitation." Id. However, this does not
mean that if a defendant is to be imprisoned for other purposes that the availa-
bility of rehabilitative programs should not be a factor in recommending a par-
ticular facility. Id.
32. Id. at 3298. When the original parole statutes were drafted, judicial
sentences were to represent the maximum term that a defendant could be incar-
cerated. Id. It was the role of the Parole Commission to determine when in the
course of that incarceration the defendant was sufficiently rehabilitated to safely
return to society. Id. Although the rehabilitation model is no longer the basis of
a parole release decision, the theory on which it is based still pervades federal
sentencing statutes. Id.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (Supp. 1986).
35. Id. §§ 3584(b), 3553(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
36. Id. § 3624(b).
1304 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1299
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ment for a felony or misdemeanor, the court may include a re-
quirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised
release after imprisonment. This decision for release is not de-
pendent upon the amount of time served but upon the judge's
decision that the defendant needs supervision after release. Sub-
section (b) specifies the maximum terms of supervised release.3 7
The court is given a list of factors to be considered in determining
if supervised release is to be included, for what period of time,
and the conditions of such release.3 8 These factors are set forth
in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5) and (a)(6).
"In effect, the term of supervised release .. .takes the place of
parole supervision under current law." 39
B. Probation
Probation may be used as a method of sentencing unless the
offense is classified as a Class A or Class B felony, 40 or is an of-
fense for which probation is precluded or if the defendant has
been sentenced at the same time to prison for the same or differ-
ent offense. 4 1 Under the new Act, probation is a type of sentence
in itself. It is not imposed as a substitute for, or as a result of a
suspension of an imposed or executed jail sentence as it is in
present law. In other words, a sentence on a single offense will
no longer be split between a jail term on the one hand and a sus-
pended sentence replaced by probation on the other.42 If proba-
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) states:
(b) Authorized terms of supervised release.-The authorized terms of
supervised release are-
(1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than three years;
(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than two years; and
(3) for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor, not more than one
year.
38. Id. § 3583(c).
39. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3308.
40. A felony is Class A if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is
life imprisonment or the maxmium penalty is death. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)(A).
The maximum term of imprisonment for Class B felonies is 20 years or more.
Id. § 3559(a)(1)(B). As previously discussed, if offenses are not classified, the
maximum term of imprisonment stated in the statute defining the offense gov-
erns the classification.
41. Id. § 3561(a).
42. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 3182, 3272. Referring to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3561(a)(3), the legislative history states:
The provision will permit latitude in the specification of the time to be
spent in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and in the nature of the
facility. It will also be more flexible than current law in permitting a
sentence to imprisonment of any permissible length to be followed by a
term during which the defendant receives street supervision. The
7
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tion once imposed is later revoked, the court may impose any
other sentence that was available at the time of the initial sentenc-
ing.45 The court must impose at least one condition of probation
if the offense is a misdemeanor or infraction and two conditions if
the offense is a felony.44 Under the present Act, conditions to
probation are discretionary.
C. Fines45
The revised fine section sets the maximum fine that may be
imposed for the various offenses.46 This restructuring shows the
Committee's belief that fines can be an effective means of achiev-
ing the goals of the criminal justice system. By raising the
amounts, the court can use fine imposition more effectively than it
has in the past. The amount of the fine depends upon whether
the defendant is an individual or an organization such as a corpo-
ration; and if the offense is a felony, misdemeanor or an
infraction. 47
Committee is of the opinion that this flexibility will permit the court to
formulate a sentence best suited to the individual needs of the
defendant.
Id.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. I 1984):
44. Id. § 3563(a).
45. These new fine provisions in the Act, although not to become effective
until November 1, 1986, are essentially identical to the current fine provisions.
Shortly after the passage of the Act, Congress passed the Criminal Fine
Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984) which became
effective December 31, 1984. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3622, 3623 (Supp. II 1984).
Although the Act's new fine provisions will supersede the provisions of the
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act, since these provisions are identical, no
substantive change will be effectuated. The policy decisions as articulated in the
legislative history behind the enactment of both Acts are still beneficial to the
understanding of the passage of these provisions. See, e.g., 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5433 and 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3182.
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (1982). Section 3571(b) states:
(b) Authorized fines.-Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
the authorized fines are-
(1) if the defendant is an individual-
(A) for a felony, or for a misdemeanor resulting in the loss of
human life, not more than $250,000; (B) for any other misde-
meanor, not more than $25,000; and
(C) for an infraction, not more than $1,000; and
(2) if the defendant is an organization-
(A) for a felony, or for a misdemeanor resulting in the loss of
human life, not more than $500,000;
(B) for any other misdemeanor, not more than $100,000; and
(C) for an infraction, not more than $10,000.
Id.
47. Id. § 3571.
1306
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When imposing a sentence of a fine, the court is to consider
various factors, including the defendant's ability to pay in view of
income, earning capacity and financial resources. If the defend-
ant is an organization, the size of the organization is to be consid-
ered.48 The court also must look at the nature of the burden on
the defendant relative to the burden of alternate punishments;
any restitution or reparation already made by the defendant to
the victim, and any obligation of such restitution or reparation
already imposed on the defendant. If the defendant is an organi-
zation, any measures taken by that organization to discipline em-
ployees or to insure against recurrence and other pertinent
equitable considerations are expected to become part of the deci-
sion. 49 The new statute limits the amount of a fine imposed on a
defendant for different offenses that arise from a common scheme
to twice the amount imposed for the most serious of the of-
fenses. 50 Section 3573 provides for modification or remission of
a fine.51 Because the initial consideration involves the ability of
the defendant to pay, any change in that ability may result in
modification or remission of the fine.5 2
A provision providing for a special assessment on convicted
persons has been added to the general provisions of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 53 This provision assesses an
amount to be paid by a convicted offender. In the case of a mis-
demeanor, the required assessment is $25.00 for an individual de-
fendant and $100.00 for a defendant other than an individual. 54
For felonies, the required assessments are $50.00 and $200.00
respectively. 55
This special assessment is collected in the same manner as
fines are collected in criminal cases. 56 The re is no articulated ex-
ception for indigent defendants, nor is there an exception for
petty offenses.57 This provision took effect on November 11,
1984.
48. Id. § 3572(a)(1).
49. Id. § 3572(a)(2)-(5).
50. Id. § 3572(b).
51. Id. § 3573.
52. Id. § 3293.
53. See id. § 3013.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 3013(b). Section 3013(b) states that "such amount so assessed
shall be collected in the manner that fines are collected in criminal cases." Id.
57. See A. Partridge, The Sentencing Options of Federal District Judges, Federal
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IV. CONCLUSION
We are squarely in the midst of a dramatic change in both the
philosophy and the terms of the sentencing policy of the United
States which will soon be carried forward in the federal courts.
No doubt difficulties will surface, as some already have, as we
enter into these rough and unpredictable waters, but this is to be
expected in any new and extensive legal enactment. While it can-
not be said that everyone associated with the research, develop-
ment, enactment and implementation of the statute is in
agreement that it will solve all of our present problems, it is safe
to say that all are in agreement that our present system has not
proved satisfactory and must be changed. With this as back-
ground, one thing is very clear and that is that the federal courts
can be expected to enter upon their duty with typical dedication
and resolve that the statute will be executed fairly, fully and justly.
10
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